Branch data Line data Source code
1 : : // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
2 : : /*
3 : : * Copyright (C) 1994 Linus Torvalds
4 : : *
5 : : * Cyrix stuff, June 1998 by:
6 : : * - Rafael R. Reilova (moved everything from head.S),
7 : : * <rreilova@ececs.uc.edu>
8 : : * - Channing Corn (tests & fixes),
9 : : * - Andrew D. Balsa (code cleanup).
10 : : */
11 : : #include <linux/init.h>
12 : : #include <linux/utsname.h>
13 : : #include <linux/cpu.h>
14 : : #include <linux/module.h>
15 : : #include <linux/nospec.h>
16 : : #include <linux/prctl.h>
17 : : #include <linux/sched/smt.h>
18 : :
19 : : #include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
20 : : #include <asm/cmdline.h>
21 : : #include <asm/bugs.h>
22 : : #include <asm/processor.h>
23 : : #include <asm/processor-flags.h>
24 : : #include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
25 : : #include <asm/msr.h>
26 : : #include <asm/vmx.h>
27 : : #include <asm/paravirt.h>
28 : : #include <asm/alternative.h>
29 : : #include <asm/pgtable.h>
30 : : #include <asm/set_memory.h>
31 : : #include <asm/intel-family.h>
32 : : #include <asm/e820/api.h>
33 : : #include <asm/hypervisor.h>
34 : :
35 : : #include "cpu.h"
36 : :
37 : : static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void);
38 : : static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
39 : : static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
40 : : static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
41 : : static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
42 : : static void __init mds_print_mitigation(void);
43 : : static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
44 : :
45 : : /* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */
46 : : u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
47 : : EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
48 : : static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex);
49 : :
50 : : /*
51 : : * The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in
52 : : * x86_spec_ctrl_base.
53 : : */
54 : : static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_mask = SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
55 : :
56 : : /*
57 : : * AMD specific MSR info for Speculative Store Bypass control.
58 : : * x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask is initialized in identify_boot_cpu().
59 : : */
60 : : u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
61 : : u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
62 : :
63 : : /* Control conditional STIBP in switch_to() */
64 : : DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp);
65 : : /* Control conditional IBPB in switch_mm() */
66 : : DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
67 : : /* Control unconditional IBPB in switch_mm() */
68 : : DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
69 : :
70 : : /* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before returning to user space */
71 : : DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear);
72 : : EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_user_clear);
73 : : /* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before idling (halt, mwait) */
74 : : DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
75 : : EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_idle_clear);
76 : :
77 : 28 : void __init check_bugs(void)
78 : : {
79 : 28 : identify_boot_cpu();
80 : :
81 : : /*
82 : : * identify_boot_cpu() initialized SMT support information, let the
83 : : * core code know.
84 : : */
85 : 28 : cpu_smt_check_topology();
86 : :
87 : 28 : if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP)) {
88 : : pr_info("CPU: ");
89 : : print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data);
90 : : }
91 : :
92 : : /*
93 : : * Read the SPEC_CTRL MSR to account for reserved bits which may
94 : : * have unknown values. AMD64_LS_CFG MSR is cached in the early AMD
95 : : * init code as it is not enumerated and depends on the family.
96 : : */
97 [ - + ]: 28 : if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
98 : 0 : rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
99 : :
100 : : /* Allow STIBP in MSR_SPEC_CTRL if supported */
101 [ - + ]: 28 : if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
102 : 0 : x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
103 : :
104 : : /* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */
105 : 28 : spectre_v1_select_mitigation();
106 : 28 : spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
107 : 28 : ssb_select_mitigation();
108 : 28 : l1tf_select_mitigation();
109 : 28 : mds_select_mitigation();
110 : 28 : taa_select_mitigation();
111 : :
112 : : /*
113 : : * As MDS and TAA mitigations are inter-related, print MDS
114 : : * mitigation until after TAA mitigation selection is done.
115 : : */
116 : 28 : mds_print_mitigation();
117 : :
118 : 28 : arch_smt_update();
119 : :
120 : : #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
121 : : /*
122 : : * Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP.
123 : : *
124 : : * - i386 is no longer supported.
125 : : * - In order to run on anything without a TSC, we need to be
126 : : * compiled for a i486.
127 : : */
128 : : if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 4)
129 : : panic("Kernel requires i486+ for 'invlpg' and other features");
130 : :
131 : : init_utsname()->machine[1] =
132 : : '0' + (boot_cpu_data.x86 > 6 ? 6 : boot_cpu_data.x86);
133 : : alternative_instructions();
134 : :
135 : : fpu__init_check_bugs();
136 : : #else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
137 : 28 : alternative_instructions();
138 : :
139 : : /*
140 : : * Make sure the first 2MB area is not mapped by huge pages
141 : : * There are typically fixed size MTRRs in there and overlapping
142 : : * MTRRs into large pages causes slow downs.
143 : : *
144 : : * Right now we don't do that with gbpages because there seems
145 : : * very little benefit for that case.
146 : : */
147 [ + - ]: 28 : if (!direct_gbpages)
148 : 28 : set_memory_4k((unsigned long)__va(0), 1);
149 : : #endif
150 : 28 : }
151 : :
152 : : void
153 : 0 : x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest)
154 : : {
155 : 0 : u64 msrval, guestval, hostval = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
156 [ # # # ]: 0 : struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
157 : :
158 : : /* Is MSR_SPEC_CTRL implemented ? */
159 [ # # # ]: 0 : if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) {
160 : : /*
161 : : * Restrict guest_spec_ctrl to supported values. Clear the
162 : : * modifiable bits in the host base value and or the
163 : : * modifiable bits from the guest value.
164 : : */
165 : 0 : guestval = hostval & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask;
166 : 0 : guestval |= guest_spec_ctrl & x86_spec_ctrl_mask;
167 : :
168 : : /* SSBD controlled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL */
169 [ # # # ]: 0 : if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ||
170 : : static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
171 : 0 : hostval |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
172 : :
173 : : /* Conditional STIBP enabled? */
174 [ # # # # ]: 0 : if (static_branch_unlikely(&switch_to_cond_stibp))
175 : 0 : hostval |= stibp_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
176 : :
177 [ # # ]: 0 : if (hostval != guestval) {
178 [ # # ]: 0 : msrval = setguest ? guestval : hostval;
179 : 0 : wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msrval);
180 : : }
181 : : }
182 : :
183 : : /*
184 : : * If SSBD is not handled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL on AMD, update
185 : : * MSR_AMD64_L2_CFG or MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL if supported.
186 : : */
187 [ # # # ]: 0 : if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD) &&
188 : : !static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
189 : : return;
190 : :
191 : : /*
192 : : * If the host has SSBD mitigation enabled, force it in the host's
193 : : * virtual MSR value. If its not permanently enabled, evaluate
194 : : * current's TIF_SSBD thread flag.
195 : : */
196 [ # # # ]: 0 : if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE))
197 : : hostval = SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
198 : : else
199 : 0 : hostval = ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
200 : :
201 : : /* Sanitize the guest value */
202 : 0 : guestval = guest_virt_spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
203 : :
204 [ # # ]: 0 : if (hostval != guestval) {
205 : 0 : unsigned long tif;
206 : :
207 [ # # ]: 0 : tif = setguest ? ssbd_spec_ctrl_to_tif(guestval) :
208 : : ssbd_spec_ctrl_to_tif(hostval);
209 : :
210 : 0 : speculation_ctrl_update(tif);
211 : : }
212 : : }
213 : : EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_virt_spec_ctrl);
214 : :
215 : 0 : static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)
216 : : {
217 : 0 : u64 msrval = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
218 : :
219 [ # # ]: 0 : if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
220 : 0 : wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, SPEC_CTRL_SSBD);
221 [ # # ]: 0 : else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD))
222 : 0 : wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msrval);
223 : 0 : }
224 : :
225 : : #undef pr_fmt
226 : : #define pr_fmt(fmt) "MDS: " fmt
227 : :
228 : : /* Default mitigation for MDS-affected CPUs */
229 : : static enum mds_mitigations mds_mitigation __ro_after_init = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
230 : : static bool mds_nosmt __ro_after_init = false;
231 : :
232 : : static const char * const mds_strings[] = {
233 : : [MDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",
234 : : [MDS_MITIGATION_FULL] = "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers",
235 : : [MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV] = "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode",
236 : : };
237 : :
238 : 28 : static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
239 : : {
240 [ - + - - ]: 28 : if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
241 : 28 : mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
242 : 28 : return;
243 : : }
244 : :
245 [ # # ]: 0 : if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL) {
246 [ # # ]: 0 : if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
247 : 0 : mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV;
248 : :
249 : 0 : static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
250 : :
251 [ # # ]: 0 : if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY) &&
252 [ # # # # ]: 0 : (mds_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt()))
253 : 0 : cpu_smt_disable(false);
254 : : }
255 : : }
256 : :
257 : 28 : static void __init mds_print_mitigation(void)
258 : : {
259 [ - + - - ]: 28 : if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || cpu_mitigations_off())
260 : 28 : return;
261 : :
262 : 0 : pr_info("%s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
263 : : }
264 : :
265 : 0 : static int __init mds_cmdline(char *str)
266 : : {
267 [ # # ]: 0 : if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
268 : : return 0;
269 : :
270 [ # # ]: 0 : if (!str)
271 : : return -EINVAL;
272 : :
273 [ # # ]: 0 : if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
274 : 0 : mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
275 [ # # ]: 0 : else if (!strcmp(str, "full"))
276 : 0 : mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
277 [ # # ]: 0 : else if (!strcmp(str, "full,nosmt")) {
278 : 0 : mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
279 : 0 : mds_nosmt = true;
280 : : }
281 : :
282 : : return 0;
283 : : }
284 : : early_param("mds", mds_cmdline);
285 : :
286 : : #undef pr_fmt
287 : : #define pr_fmt(fmt) "TAA: " fmt
288 : :
289 : : enum taa_mitigations {
290 : : TAA_MITIGATION_OFF,
291 : : TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
292 : : TAA_MITIGATION_VERW,
293 : : TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED,
294 : : };
295 : :
296 : : /* Default mitigation for TAA-affected CPUs */
297 : : static enum taa_mitigations taa_mitigation __ro_after_init = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
298 : : static bool taa_nosmt __ro_after_init;
299 : :
300 : : static const char * const taa_strings[] = {
301 : : [TAA_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",
302 : : [TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode",
303 : : [TAA_MITIGATION_VERW] = "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers",
304 : : [TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED] = "Mitigation: TSX disabled",
305 : : };
306 : :
307 : 28 : static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
308 : : {
309 : 28 : u64 ia32_cap;
310 : :
311 [ + - ]: 28 : if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) {
312 : 28 : taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
313 : 28 : return;
314 : : }
315 : :
316 : : /* TSX previously disabled by tsx=off */
317 [ # # ]: 0 : if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) {
318 : 0 : taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED;
319 : 0 : goto out;
320 : : }
321 : :
322 [ # # ]: 0 : if (cpu_mitigations_off()) {
323 : 0 : taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
324 : 0 : return;
325 : : }
326 : :
327 : : /*
328 : : * TAA mitigation via VERW is turned off if both
329 : : * tsx_async_abort=off and mds=off are specified.
330 : : */
331 [ # # ]: 0 : if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF &&
332 [ # # ]: 0 : mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF)
333 : 0 : goto out;
334 : :
335 [ # # ]: 0 : if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
336 : 0 : taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
337 : : else
338 : 0 : taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
339 : :
340 : : /*
341 : : * VERW doesn't clear the CPU buffers when MD_CLEAR=1 and MDS_NO=1.
342 : : * A microcode update fixes this behavior to clear CPU buffers. It also
343 : : * adds support for MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL which is enumerated by the
344 : : * ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR bit.
345 : : *
346 : : * On MDS_NO=1 CPUs if ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR is not set, microcode
347 : : * update is required.
348 : : */
349 : 0 : ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
350 [ # # ]: 0 : if ( (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) &&
351 : : !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
352 : 0 : taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
353 : :
354 : : /*
355 : : * TSX is enabled, select alternate mitigation for TAA which is
356 : : * the same as MDS. Enable MDS static branch to clear CPU buffers.
357 : : *
358 : : * For guests that can't determine whether the correct microcode is
359 : : * present on host, enable the mitigation for UCODE_NEEDED as well.
360 : : */
361 : 0 : static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
362 : :
363 [ # # # # ]: 0 : if (taa_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
364 : 0 : cpu_smt_disable(false);
365 : :
366 : : /*
367 : : * Update MDS mitigation, if necessary, as the mds_user_clear is
368 : : * now enabled for TAA mitigation.
369 : : */
370 [ # # # # ]: 0 : if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF &&
371 : : boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) {
372 : 0 : mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
373 : 0 : mds_select_mitigation();
374 : : }
375 : 0 : out:
376 : 0 : pr_info("%s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
377 : : }
378 : :
379 : 0 : static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline(char *str)
380 : : {
381 [ # # ]: 0 : if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA))
382 : : return 0;
383 : :
384 [ # # ]: 0 : if (!str)
385 : : return -EINVAL;
386 : :
387 [ # # ]: 0 : if (!strcmp(str, "off")) {
388 : 0 : taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
389 [ # # ]: 0 : } else if (!strcmp(str, "full")) {
390 : 0 : taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
391 [ # # ]: 0 : } else if (!strcmp(str, "full,nosmt")) {
392 : 0 : taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
393 : 0 : taa_nosmt = true;
394 : : }
395 : :
396 : : return 0;
397 : : }
398 : : early_param("tsx_async_abort", tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline);
399 : :
400 : : #undef pr_fmt
401 : : #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V1 : " fmt
402 : :
403 : : enum spectre_v1_mitigation {
404 : : SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE,
405 : : SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO,
406 : : };
407 : :
408 : : static enum spectre_v1_mitigation spectre_v1_mitigation __ro_after_init =
409 : : SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO;
410 : :
411 : : static const char * const spectre_v1_strings[] = {
412 : : [SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable: __user pointer sanitization and usercopy barriers only; no swapgs barriers",
413 : : [SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO] = "Mitigation: usercopy/swapgs barriers and __user pointer sanitization",
414 : : };
415 : :
416 : : /*
417 : : * Does SMAP provide full mitigation against speculative kernel access to
418 : : * userspace?
419 : : */
420 : 28 : static bool smap_works_speculatively(void)
421 : : {
422 [ - + ]: 28 : if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMAP))
423 : : return false;
424 : :
425 : : /*
426 : : * On CPUs which are vulnerable to Meltdown, SMAP does not
427 : : * prevent speculative access to user data in the L1 cache.
428 : : * Consider SMAP to be non-functional as a mitigation on these
429 : : * CPUs.
430 : : */
431 [ # # ]: 0 : if (boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
432 : 0 : return false;
433 : :
434 : : return true;
435 : : }
436 : :
437 : 28 : static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void)
438 : : {
439 [ + - - + ]: 28 : if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
440 : 0 : spectre_v1_mitigation = SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE;
441 : 0 : return;
442 : : }
443 : :
444 [ + - ]: 28 : if (spectre_v1_mitigation == SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO) {
445 : : /*
446 : : * With Spectre v1, a user can speculatively control either
447 : : * path of a conditional swapgs with a user-controlled GS
448 : : * value. The mitigation is to add lfences to both code paths.
449 : : *
450 : : * If FSGSBASE is enabled, the user can put a kernel address in
451 : : * GS, in which case SMAP provides no protection.
452 : : *
453 : : * [ NOTE: Don't check for X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE until the
454 : : * FSGSBASE enablement patches have been merged. ]
455 : : *
456 : : * If FSGSBASE is disabled, the user can only put a user space
457 : : * address in GS. That makes an attack harder, but still
458 : : * possible if there's no SMAP protection.
459 : : */
460 [ + - ]: 28 : if (!smap_works_speculatively()) {
461 : : /*
462 : : * Mitigation can be provided from SWAPGS itself or
463 : : * PTI as the CR3 write in the Meltdown mitigation
464 : : * is serializing.
465 : : *
466 : : * If neither is there, mitigate with an LFENCE to
467 : : * stop speculation through swapgs.
468 : : */
469 [ - + - - ]: 28 : if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS) &&
470 : : !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
471 : 0 : setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER);
472 : :
473 : : /*
474 : : * Enable lfences in the kernel entry (non-swapgs)
475 : : * paths, to prevent user entry from speculatively
476 : : * skipping swapgs.
477 : : */
478 : 56 : setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL);
479 : : }
480 : : }
481 : :
482 : 28 : pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v1_strings[spectre_v1_mitigation]);
483 : : }
484 : :
485 : 0 : static int __init nospectre_v1_cmdline(char *str)
486 : : {
487 : 0 : spectre_v1_mitigation = SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE;
488 : 0 : return 0;
489 : : }
490 : : early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline);
491 : :
492 : : #undef pr_fmt
493 : : #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt
494 : :
495 : : static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init =
496 : : SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
497 : :
498 : : static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user __ro_after_init =
499 : : SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
500 : :
501 : : #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
502 : : static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;
503 : :
504 : 84 : bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline)
505 : : {
506 [ + - - + ]: 84 : if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE || has_retpoline)
507 : : return true;
508 : :
509 : 0 : pr_err("System may be vulnerable to spectre v2\n");
510 : 0 : spectre_v2_bad_module = true;
511 : 0 : return false;
512 : : }
513 : :
514 : : static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void)
515 : : {
516 : : return spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : "";
517 : : }
518 : : #else
519 : : static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; }
520 : : #endif
521 : :
522 : 0 : static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt)
523 : : {
524 : 0 : int len = strlen(opt);
525 : :
526 [ # # # # ]: 0 : return len == arglen && !strncmp(arg, opt, len);
527 : : }
528 : :
529 : : /* The kernel command line selection for spectre v2 */
530 : : enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd {
531 : : SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE,
532 : : SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO,
533 : : SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE,
534 : : SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE,
535 : : SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
536 : : SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD,
537 : : };
538 : :
539 : : enum spectre_v2_user_cmd {
540 : : SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE,
541 : : SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO,
542 : : SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE,
543 : : SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL,
544 : : SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB,
545 : : SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP,
546 : : SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB,
547 : : };
548 : :
549 : : static const char * const spectre_v2_user_strings[] = {
550 : : [SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE] = "User space: Vulnerable",
551 : : [SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT] = "User space: Mitigation: STIBP protection",
552 : : [SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED] = "User space: Mitigation: STIBP always-on protection",
553 : : [SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL] = "User space: Mitigation: STIBP via prctl",
554 : : [SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP] = "User space: Mitigation: STIBP via seccomp and prctl",
555 : : };
556 : :
557 : : static const struct {
558 : : const char *option;
559 : : enum spectre_v2_user_cmd cmd;
560 : : bool secure;
561 : : } v2_user_options[] __initconst = {
562 : : { "auto", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO, false },
563 : : { "off", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE, false },
564 : : { "on", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE, true },
565 : : { "prctl", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL, false },
566 : : { "prctl,ibpb", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB, false },
567 : : { "seccomp", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP, false },
568 : : { "seccomp,ibpb", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB, false },
569 : : };
570 : :
571 : 0 : static void __init spec_v2_user_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure)
572 : : {
573 [ # # ]: 0 : if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) != secure)
574 : 0 : pr_info("spectre_v2_user=%s forced on command line.\n", reason);
575 : 0 : }
576 : :
577 : : static enum spectre_v2_user_cmd __init
578 : 0 : spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
579 : : {
580 : 0 : char arg[20];
581 : 0 : int ret, i;
582 : :
583 [ # # # ]: 0 : switch (v2_cmd) {
584 : : case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE:
585 : : return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE;
586 : 0 : case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
587 : 0 : return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE;
588 : : default:
589 : 0 : break;
590 : : }
591 : :
592 : 0 : ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2_user",
593 : : arg, sizeof(arg));
594 [ # # ]: 0 : if (ret < 0)
595 : : return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
596 : :
597 [ # # ]: 0 : for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(v2_user_options); i++) {
598 [ # # ]: 0 : if (match_option(arg, ret, v2_user_options[i].option)) {
599 : 0 : spec_v2_user_print_cond(v2_user_options[i].option,
600 : 0 : v2_user_options[i].secure);
601 : 0 : return v2_user_options[i].cmd;
602 : : }
603 : : }
604 : :
605 : 0 : pr_err("Unknown user space protection option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
606 : 0 : return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
607 : : }
608 : :
609 : : static void __init
610 : 28 : spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
611 : : {
612 : 28 : enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
613 : 28 : bool smt_possible = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP);
614 : 28 : enum spectre_v2_user_cmd cmd;
615 : :
616 [ + - - + ]: 56 : if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
617 : : return;
618 : :
619 [ # # ]: 0 : if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED ||
620 : : cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED)
621 : 0 : smt_possible = false;
622 : :
623 : 0 : cmd = spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(v2_cmd);
624 [ # # # # : 0 : switch (cmd) {
# ]
625 : 0 : case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE:
626 : 0 : goto set_mode;
627 : : case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE:
628 : : mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT;
629 : : break;
630 : : case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL:
631 : : case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB:
632 : 0 : mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL;
633 : 0 : break;
634 : : case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO:
635 : : case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP:
636 : : case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB:
637 : 0 : if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECCOMP))
638 : 0 : mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP;
639 : : else
640 : : mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL;
641 : 0 : break;
642 : : }
643 : :
644 : : /*
645 : : * At this point, an STIBP mode other than "off" has been set.
646 : : * If STIBP support is not being forced, check if STIBP always-on
647 : : * is preferred.
648 : : */
649 [ # # ]: 0 : if (mode != SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT &&
650 : : boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON))
651 : 0 : mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED;
652 : :
653 : : /* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
654 [ # # ]: 0 : if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
655 : 0 : setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
656 : :
657 [ # # # ]: 0 : switch (cmd) {
658 : 0 : case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE:
659 : : case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB:
660 : : case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB:
661 : 0 : static_branch_enable(&switch_mm_always_ibpb);
662 : 0 : break;
663 : 0 : case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL:
664 : : case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO:
665 : : case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP:
666 : 0 : static_branch_enable(&switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
667 : 0 : break;
668 : : default:
669 : : break;
670 : : }
671 : :
672 [ # # ]: 0 : pr_info("mitigation: Enabling %s Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n",
673 : : static_key_enabled(&switch_mm_always_ibpb) ?
674 : : "always-on" : "conditional");
675 : : }
676 : :
677 : : /* If enhanced IBRS is enabled no STIBP required */
678 [ # # ]: 0 : if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
679 : : return;
680 : :
681 : : /*
682 : : * If SMT is not possible or STIBP is not available clear the STIBP
683 : : * mode.
684 : : */
685 [ # # # # ]: 0 : if (!smt_possible || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
686 : : mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
687 : 0 : set_mode:
688 : 0 : spectre_v2_user = mode;
689 : : /* Only print the STIBP mode when SMT possible */
690 [ # # ]: 0 : if (smt_possible)
691 : 0 : pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_user_strings[mode]);
692 : : }
693 : :
694 : : static const char * const spectre_v2_strings[] = {
695 : : [SPECTRE_V2_NONE] = "Vulnerable",
696 : : [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC] = "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline",
697 : : [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD] = "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline",
698 : : [SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
699 : : };
700 : :
701 : : static const struct {
702 : : const char *option;
703 : : enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd;
704 : : bool secure;
705 : : } mitigation_options[] __initconst = {
706 : : { "off", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE, false },
707 : : { "on", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE, true },
708 : : { "retpoline", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE, false },
709 : : { "retpoline,amd", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD, false },
710 : : { "retpoline,generic", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, false },
711 : : { "auto", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO, false },
712 : : };
713 : :
714 : 0 : static void __init spec_v2_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure)
715 : : {
716 [ # # ]: 0 : if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) != secure)
717 : 0 : pr_info("%s selected on command line.\n", reason);
718 : 0 : }
719 : :
720 : 28 : static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
721 : : {
722 : 28 : enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
723 : 28 : char arg[20];
724 : 28 : int ret, i;
725 : :
726 [ + - - + ]: 56 : if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2") ||
727 : 28 : cpu_mitigations_off())
728 : 0 : return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
729 : :
730 : 28 : ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
731 [ - + ]: 28 : if (ret < 0)
732 : : return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
733 : :
734 [ # # ]: 0 : for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options); i++) {
735 [ # # ]: 0 : if (!match_option(arg, ret, mitigation_options[i].option))
736 : 0 : continue;
737 : 0 : cmd = mitigation_options[i].cmd;
738 : 0 : break;
739 : : }
740 : :
741 [ # # ]: 0 : if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options)) {
742 : 0 : pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
743 : 0 : return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
744 : : }
745 : :
746 : 0 : if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE ||
747 : : cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD ||
748 : : cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC) &&
749 : : !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
750 : : pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n", mitigation_options[i].option);
751 : : return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
752 : : }
753 : :
754 [ # # ]: 0 : if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD &&
755 [ # # # # ]: 0 : boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON &&
756 : : boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
757 : 0 : pr_err("retpoline,amd selected but CPU is not AMD. Switching to AUTO select\n");
758 : 0 : return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
759 : : }
760 : :
761 : 0 : spec_v2_print_cond(mitigation_options[i].option,
762 : 0 : mitigation_options[i].secure);
763 : 0 : return cmd;
764 : : }
765 : :
766 : 28 : static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
767 : : {
768 : 28 : enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
769 : 28 : enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
770 : :
771 : : /*
772 : : * If the CPU is not affected and the command line mode is NONE or AUTO
773 : : * then nothing to do.
774 : : */
775 [ - + - - ]: 28 : if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) &&
776 : : (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE || cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO))
777 : : return;
778 : :
779 [ + - - - : 28 : switch (cmd) {
- - ]
780 : : case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE:
781 : : return;
782 : :
783 : : case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
784 : : case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO:
785 [ - + ]: 28 : if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) {
786 : 0 : mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED;
787 : : /* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */
788 : 0 : x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
789 : 0 : wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
790 : 0 : goto specv2_set_mode;
791 : : }
792 : 28 : if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
793 : 28 : goto retpoline_auto;
794 : : break;
795 : : case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD:
796 : 0 : if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
797 : 0 : goto retpoline_amd;
798 : : break;
799 : : case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC:
800 : 0 : if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
801 : 0 : goto retpoline_generic;
802 : : break;
803 : : case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE:
804 : 0 : if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
805 : 0 : goto retpoline_auto;
806 : : break;
807 : : }
808 : 0 : pr_err("Spectre mitigation: kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
809 : 0 : return;
810 : :
811 : 28 : retpoline_auto:
812 [ + - ]: 28 : if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ||
813 : : boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) {
814 : 28 : retpoline_amd:
815 [ - + ]: 28 : if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) {
816 : 0 : pr_err("Spectre mitigation: LFENCE not serializing, switching to generic retpoline\n");
817 : 0 : goto retpoline_generic;
818 : : }
819 : 28 : mode = SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD;
820 : 56 : setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD);
821 : 56 : setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
822 : : } else {
823 : 0 : retpoline_generic:
824 : 0 : mode = SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC;
825 : 0 : setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
826 : : }
827 : :
828 : 28 : specv2_set_mode:
829 : 28 : spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
830 : 28 : pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
831 : :
832 : : /*
833 : : * If spectre v2 protection has been enabled, unconditionally fill
834 : : * RSB during a context switch; this protects against two independent
835 : : * issues:
836 : : *
837 : : * - RSB underflow (and switch to BTB) on Skylake+
838 : : * - SpectreRSB variant of spectre v2 on X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 CPUs
839 : : */
840 : 56 : setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
841 : 28 : pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
842 : :
843 : : /*
844 : : * Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect
845 : : * branches. Enhanced IBRS protects firmware too, so, enable restricted
846 : : * speculation around firmware calls only when Enhanced IBRS isn't
847 : : * supported.
848 : : *
849 : : * Use "mode" to check Enhanced IBRS instead of boot_cpu_has(), because
850 : : * the user might select retpoline on the kernel command line and if
851 : : * the CPU supports Enhanced IBRS, kernel might un-intentionally not
852 : : * enable IBRS around firmware calls.
853 : : */
854 [ - + - - ]: 28 : if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && mode != SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) {
855 : 0 : setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);
856 : 0 : pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n");
857 : : }
858 : :
859 : : /* Set up IBPB and STIBP depending on the general spectre V2 command */
860 : 28 : spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(cmd);
861 : : }
862 : :
863 : 0 : static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused)
864 : : {
865 : 0 : wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
866 : 0 : }
867 : :
868 : : /* Update x86_spec_ctrl_base in case SMT state changed. */
869 : 0 : static void update_stibp_strict(void)
870 : : {
871 : 0 : u64 mask = x86_spec_ctrl_base & ~SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
872 : :
873 [ # # # # ]: 0 : if (sched_smt_active())
874 : 0 : mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
875 : :
876 [ # # ]: 0 : if (mask == x86_spec_ctrl_base)
877 : : return;
878 : :
879 [ # # ]: 0 : pr_info("Update user space SMT mitigation: STIBP %s\n",
880 : : mask & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP ? "always-on" : "off");
881 : 0 : x86_spec_ctrl_base = mask;
882 : 0 : on_each_cpu(update_stibp_msr, NULL, 1);
883 : : }
884 : :
885 : : /* Update the static key controlling the evaluation of TIF_SPEC_IB */
886 : 0 : static void update_indir_branch_cond(void)
887 : : {
888 [ # # # # ]: 0 : if (sched_smt_active())
889 : 0 : static_branch_enable(&switch_to_cond_stibp);
890 : : else
891 : 0 : static_branch_disable(&switch_to_cond_stibp);
892 : 0 : }
893 : :
894 : : #undef pr_fmt
895 : : #define pr_fmt(fmt) fmt
896 : :
897 : : /* Update the static key controlling the MDS CPU buffer clear in idle */
898 : 0 : static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
899 : : {
900 : : /*
901 : : * Enable the idle clearing if SMT is active on CPUs which are
902 : : * affected only by MSBDS and not any other MDS variant.
903 : : *
904 : : * The other variants cannot be mitigated when SMT is enabled, so
905 : : * clearing the buffers on idle just to prevent the Store Buffer
906 : : * repartitioning leak would be a window dressing exercise.
907 : : */
908 [ # # ]: 0 : if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
909 : : return;
910 : :
911 [ # # # # ]: 0 : if (sched_smt_active())
912 : 0 : static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
913 : : else
914 : 0 : static_branch_disable(&mds_idle_clear);
915 : : }
916 : :
917 : : #define MDS_MSG_SMT "MDS CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html for more details.\n"
918 : : #define TAA_MSG_SMT "TAA CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html for more details.\n"
919 : :
920 : 28 : void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
921 : : {
922 : 28 : mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
923 : :
924 [ - - + ]: 28 : switch (spectre_v2_user) {
925 : : case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE:
926 : : break;
927 : 0 : case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT:
928 : : case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED:
929 : 0 : update_stibp_strict();
930 : 0 : break;
931 : 0 : case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL:
932 : : case SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP:
933 : 0 : update_indir_branch_cond();
934 : 0 : break;
935 : : }
936 : :
937 [ - + ]: 28 : switch (mds_mitigation) {
938 : : case MDS_MITIGATION_FULL:
939 : : case MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV:
940 [ # # # # : 0 : if (sched_smt_active() && !boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
# # ]
941 [ # # ]: 0 : pr_warn_once(MDS_MSG_SMT);
942 : 0 : update_mds_branch_idle();
943 : 0 : break;
944 : : case MDS_MITIGATION_OFF:
945 : : break;
946 : : }
947 : :
948 [ - + ]: 28 : switch (taa_mitigation) {
949 : : case TAA_MITIGATION_VERW:
950 : : case TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
951 [ # # # # ]: 0 : if (sched_smt_active())
952 [ # # ]: 0 : pr_warn_once(TAA_MSG_SMT);
953 : : break;
954 : : case TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED:
955 : : case TAA_MITIGATION_OFF:
956 : : break;
957 : : }
958 : :
959 : 28 : mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
960 : 28 : }
961 : :
962 : : #undef pr_fmt
963 : : #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Speculative Store Bypass: " fmt
964 : :
965 : : static enum ssb_mitigation ssb_mode __ro_after_init = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE;
966 : :
967 : : /* The kernel command line selection */
968 : : enum ssb_mitigation_cmd {
969 : : SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE,
970 : : SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO,
971 : : SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON,
972 : : SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_PRCTL,
973 : : SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_SECCOMP,
974 : : };
975 : :
976 : : static const char * const ssb_strings[] = {
977 : : [SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE] = "Vulnerable",
978 : : [SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE] = "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled",
979 : : [SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL] = "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl",
980 : : [SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP] = "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl and seccomp",
981 : : };
982 : :
983 : : static const struct {
984 : : const char *option;
985 : : enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd;
986 : : } ssb_mitigation_options[] __initconst = {
987 : : { "auto", SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO }, /* Platform decides */
988 : : { "on", SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON }, /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass */
989 : : { "off", SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE }, /* Don't touch Speculative Store Bypass */
990 : : { "prctl", SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_PRCTL }, /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass via prctl */
991 : : { "seccomp", SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_SECCOMP }, /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass via prctl and seccomp */
992 : : };
993 : :
994 : 0 : static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
995 : : {
996 : 0 : enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
997 : 0 : char arg[20];
998 : 0 : int ret, i;
999 : :
1000 [ # # # # ]: 0 : if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable") ||
1001 : 0 : cpu_mitigations_off()) {
1002 : 0 : return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE;
1003 : : } else {
1004 : 0 : ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spec_store_bypass_disable",
1005 : : arg, sizeof(arg));
1006 [ # # ]: 0 : if (ret < 0)
1007 : : return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
1008 : :
1009 [ # # ]: 0 : for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ssb_mitigation_options); i++) {
1010 [ # # ]: 0 : if (!match_option(arg, ret, ssb_mitigation_options[i].option))
1011 : 0 : continue;
1012 : :
1013 : 0 : cmd = ssb_mitigation_options[i].cmd;
1014 : 0 : break;
1015 : : }
1016 : :
1017 [ # # ]: 0 : if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(ssb_mitigation_options)) {
1018 : 0 : pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
1019 : 0 : return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
1020 : : }
1021 : : }
1022 : :
1023 : : return cmd;
1024 : : }
1025 : :
1026 : 28 : static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void)
1027 : : {
1028 : 28 : enum ssb_mitigation mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE;
1029 : 28 : enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd;
1030 : :
1031 [ - + ]: 28 : if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD))
1032 : : return mode;
1033 : :
1034 : 0 : cmd = ssb_parse_cmdline();
1035 [ # # # # ]: 0 : if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS) &&
1036 : : (cmd == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE ||
1037 : : cmd == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO))
1038 : : return mode;
1039 : :
1040 [ # # ]: 0 : switch (cmd) {
1041 : : case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO:
1042 : : case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_SECCOMP:
1043 : : /*
1044 : : * Choose prctl+seccomp as the default mode if seccomp is
1045 : : * enabled.
1046 : : */
1047 : : if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECCOMP))
1048 : : mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP;
1049 : : else
1050 : : mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL;
1051 : : break;
1052 : : case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON:
1053 : : mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE;
1054 : : break;
1055 : : case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_PRCTL:
1056 : : mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL;
1057 : : break;
1058 : : case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE:
1059 : : break;
1060 : : }
1061 : :
1062 : : /*
1063 : : * If SSBD is controlled by the SPEC_CTRL MSR, then set the proper
1064 : : * bit in the mask to allow guests to use the mitigation even in the
1065 : : * case where the host does not enable it.
1066 : : */
1067 [ # # # ]: 0 : if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ||
1068 : : static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
1069 : 0 : x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
1070 : : }
1071 : :
1072 : : /*
1073 : : * We have three CPU feature flags that are in play here:
1074 : : * - X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS - CPU is susceptible.
1075 : : * - X86_FEATURE_SSBD - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass
1076 : : * - X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE - engage the mitigation
1077 : : */
1078 [ # # ]: 0 : if (mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE) {
1079 : 0 : setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE);
1080 : : /*
1081 : : * Intel uses the SPEC CTRL MSR Bit(2) for this, while AMD may
1082 : : * use a completely different MSR and bit dependent on family.
1083 : : */
1084 [ # # # ]: 0 : if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) &&
1085 : : !static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
1086 : 0 : x86_amd_ssb_disable();
1087 : : } else {
1088 : 0 : x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
1089 : 0 : wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
1090 : : }
1091 : : }
1092 : :
1093 : : return mode;
1094 : : }
1095 : :
1096 : 28 : static void ssb_select_mitigation(void)
1097 : : {
1098 : 28 : ssb_mode = __ssb_select_mitigation();
1099 : :
1100 [ + - ]: 28 : if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS))
1101 : 28 : pr_info("%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]);
1102 : 28 : }
1103 : :
1104 : : #undef pr_fmt
1105 : : #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Speculation prctl: " fmt
1106 : :
1107 : 0 : static void task_update_spec_tif(struct task_struct *tsk)
1108 : : {
1109 : : /* Force the update of the real TIF bits */
1110 : 0 : set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE);
1111 : :
1112 : : /*
1113 : : * Immediately update the speculation control MSRs for the current
1114 : : * task, but for a non-current task delay setting the CPU
1115 : : * mitigation until it is scheduled next.
1116 : : *
1117 : : * This can only happen for SECCOMP mitigation. For PRCTL it's
1118 : : * always the current task.
1119 : : */
1120 [ # # ]: 0 : if (tsk == current)
1121 : 0 : speculation_ctrl_update_current();
1122 : 0 : }
1123 : :
1124 : 0 : static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
1125 : : {
1126 [ # # ]: 0 : if (ssb_mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL &&
1127 : : ssb_mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP)
1128 : : return -ENXIO;
1129 : :
1130 [ # # # # : 0 : switch (ctrl) {
# ]
1131 : : case PR_SPEC_ENABLE:
1132 : : /* If speculation is force disabled, enable is not allowed */
1133 [ # # ]: 0 : if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
1134 : : return -EPERM;
1135 : 0 : task_clear_spec_ssb_disable(task);
1136 : 0 : task_clear_spec_ssb_noexec(task);
1137 : 0 : task_update_spec_tif(task);
1138 : 0 : break;
1139 : : case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
1140 : 0 : task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
1141 : 0 : task_clear_spec_ssb_noexec(task);
1142 : 0 : task_update_spec_tif(task);
1143 : 0 : break;
1144 : : case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
1145 : 0 : task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
1146 : 0 : task_set_spec_ssb_force_disable(task);
1147 : 0 : task_clear_spec_ssb_noexec(task);
1148 : 0 : task_update_spec_tif(task);
1149 : 0 : break;
1150 : : case PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC:
1151 [ # # ]: 0 : if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
1152 : : return -EPERM;
1153 : 0 : task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
1154 : 0 : task_set_spec_ssb_noexec(task);
1155 : 0 : task_update_spec_tif(task);
1156 : 0 : break;
1157 : : default:
1158 : : return -ERANGE;
1159 : : }
1160 : : return 0;
1161 : : }
1162 : :
1163 : 0 : static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
1164 : : {
1165 [ # # # ]: 0 : switch (ctrl) {
1166 : 0 : case PR_SPEC_ENABLE:
1167 [ # # ]: 0 : if (spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
1168 : : return 0;
1169 : : /*
1170 : : * Indirect branch speculation is always disabled in strict
1171 : : * mode.
1172 : : */
1173 [ # # ]: 0 : if (spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
1174 : : spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
1175 : : return -EPERM;
1176 : 0 : task_clear_spec_ib_disable(task);
1177 : 0 : task_update_spec_tif(task);
1178 : 0 : break;
1179 : 0 : case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
1180 : : case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
1181 : : /*
1182 : : * Indirect branch speculation is always allowed when
1183 : : * mitigation is force disabled.
1184 : : */
1185 [ # # ]: 0 : if (spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
1186 : : return -EPERM;
1187 [ # # ]: 0 : if (spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
1188 : : spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
1189 : : return 0;
1190 : 0 : task_set_spec_ib_disable(task);
1191 [ # # ]: 0 : if (ctrl == PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE)
1192 : 0 : task_set_spec_ib_force_disable(task);
1193 : 0 : task_update_spec_tif(task);
1194 : 0 : break;
1195 : : default:
1196 : : return -ERANGE;
1197 : : }
1198 : : return 0;
1199 : : }
1200 : :
1201 : 0 : int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which,
1202 : : unsigned long ctrl)
1203 : : {
1204 [ # # # ]: 0 : switch (which) {
1205 : 0 : case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
1206 : 0 : return ssb_prctl_set(task, ctrl);
1207 : 0 : case PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH:
1208 : 0 : return ib_prctl_set(task, ctrl);
1209 : : default:
1210 : : return -ENODEV;
1211 : : }
1212 : : }
1213 : :
1214 : : #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
1215 : 1568 : void arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task)
1216 : : {
1217 [ - + ]: 1568 : if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP)
1218 : 0 : ssb_prctl_set(task, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE);
1219 [ - + ]: 1568 : if (spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP)
1220 : 0 : ib_prctl_set(task, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE);
1221 : 1568 : }
1222 : : #endif
1223 : :
1224 : 618 : static int ssb_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
1225 : : {
1226 [ - + - ]: 618 : switch (ssb_mode) {
1227 : : case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE:
1228 : : return PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
1229 : : case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP:
1230 : : case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL:
1231 [ # # ]: 0 : if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
1232 : : return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE;
1233 [ # # ]: 0 : if (task_spec_ssb_noexec(task))
1234 : : return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC;
1235 [ # # ]: 0 : if (task_spec_ssb_disable(task))
1236 : 0 : return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
1237 : : return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
1238 : : default:
1239 [ + - ]: 618 : if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS))
1240 : 618 : return PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
1241 : : return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
1242 : : }
1243 : : }
1244 : :
1245 : 0 : static int ib_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
1246 : : {
1247 [ # # ]: 0 : if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
1248 : : return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
1249 : :
1250 [ # # # # ]: 0 : switch (spectre_v2_user) {
1251 : : case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE:
1252 : : return PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
1253 : : case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL:
1254 : : case SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP:
1255 [ # # ]: 0 : if (task_spec_ib_force_disable(task))
1256 : : return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE;
1257 [ # # ]: 0 : if (task_spec_ib_disable(task))
1258 : 0 : return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
1259 : : return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
1260 : 0 : case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT:
1261 : : case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED:
1262 : 0 : return PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
1263 : 0 : default:
1264 : 0 : return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
1265 : : }
1266 : : }
1267 : :
1268 : 618 : int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which)
1269 : : {
1270 [ + - - ]: 618 : switch (which) {
1271 : 618 : case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
1272 : 618 : return ssb_prctl_get(task);
1273 : 0 : case PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH:
1274 : 0 : return ib_prctl_get(task);
1275 : : default:
1276 : : return -ENODEV;
1277 : : }
1278 : : }
1279 : :
1280 : 0 : void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
1281 : : {
1282 [ # # ]: 0 : if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
1283 : 0 : wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
1284 : :
1285 [ # # ]: 0 : if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE)
1286 : 0 : x86_amd_ssb_disable();
1287 : 0 : }
1288 : :
1289 : : bool itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation;
1290 : : EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation);
1291 : :
1292 : : #undef pr_fmt
1293 : : #define pr_fmt(fmt) "L1TF: " fmt
1294 : :
1295 : : /* Default mitigation for L1TF-affected CPUs */
1296 : : enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation __ro_after_init = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH;
1297 : : #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
1298 : : EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l1tf_mitigation);
1299 : : #endif
1300 : : enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO;
1301 : : EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l1tf_vmx_mitigation);
1302 : :
1303 : : /*
1304 : : * These CPUs all support 44bits physical address space internally in the
1305 : : * cache but CPUID can report a smaller number of physical address bits.
1306 : : *
1307 : : * The L1TF mitigation uses the top most address bit for the inversion of
1308 : : * non present PTEs. When the installed memory reaches into the top most
1309 : : * address bit due to memory holes, which has been observed on machines
1310 : : * which report 36bits physical address bits and have 32G RAM installed,
1311 : : * then the mitigation range check in l1tf_select_mitigation() triggers.
1312 : : * This is a false positive because the mitigation is still possible due to
1313 : : * the fact that the cache uses 44bit internally. Use the cache bits
1314 : : * instead of the reported physical bits and adjust them on the affected
1315 : : * machines to 44bit if the reported bits are less than 44.
1316 : : */
1317 : 0 : static void override_cache_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
1318 : : {
1319 [ # # ]: 0 : if (c->x86 != 6)
1320 : : return;
1321 : :
1322 [ # # ]: 0 : switch (c->x86_model) {
1323 : 0 : case INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM:
1324 : : case INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE:
1325 : : case INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE:
1326 : : case INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE:
1327 : : case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL:
1328 : : case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_L:
1329 : : case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_G:
1330 : : case INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL:
1331 : : case INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_G:
1332 : : case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_L:
1333 : : case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE:
1334 : : case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_L:
1335 : : case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE:
1336 [ # # ]: 0 : if (c->x86_cache_bits < 44)
1337 : 0 : c->x86_cache_bits = 44;
1338 : : break;
1339 : : }
1340 : 0 : }
1341 : :
1342 : 28 : static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
1343 : : {
1344 : 28 : u64 half_pa;
1345 : :
1346 [ - + ]: 28 : if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
1347 : : return;
1348 : :
1349 [ # # ]: 0 : if (cpu_mitigations_off())
1350 : 0 : l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
1351 [ # # ]: 0 : else if (cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
1352 : 0 : l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT;
1353 : :
1354 : 0 : override_cache_bits(&boot_cpu_data);
1355 : :
1356 [ # # # ]: 0 : switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
1357 : : case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF:
1358 : : case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
1359 : : case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
1360 : : break;
1361 : 0 : case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
1362 : : case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:
1363 : 0 : cpu_smt_disable(false);
1364 : 0 : break;
1365 : 0 : case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE:
1366 : 0 : cpu_smt_disable(true);
1367 : 0 : break;
1368 : : }
1369 : :
1370 : : #if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS == 2
1371 : : pr_warn("Kernel not compiled for PAE. No mitigation for L1TF\n");
1372 : : return;
1373 : : #endif
1374 : :
1375 [ # # ]: 0 : half_pa = (u64)l1tf_pfn_limit() << PAGE_SHIFT;
1376 [ # # # # ]: 0 : if (l1tf_mitigation != L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF &&
1377 : 0 : e820__mapped_any(half_pa, ULLONG_MAX - half_pa, E820_TYPE_RAM)) {
1378 : 0 : pr_warn("System has more than MAX_PA/2 memory. L1TF mitigation not effective.\n");
1379 : 0 : pr_info("You may make it effective by booting the kernel with mem=%llu parameter.\n",
1380 : : half_pa);
1381 : 0 : pr_info("However, doing so will make a part of your RAM unusable.\n");
1382 : 0 : pr_info("Reading https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html might help you decide.\n");
1383 : 0 : return;
1384 : : }
1385 : :
1386 : 0 : setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV);
1387 : : }
1388 : :
1389 : 0 : static int __init l1tf_cmdline(char *str)
1390 : : {
1391 [ # # ]: 0 : if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
1392 : : return 0;
1393 : :
1394 [ # # ]: 0 : if (!str)
1395 : : return -EINVAL;
1396 : :
1397 [ # # ]: 0 : if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
1398 : 0 : l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
1399 [ # # ]: 0 : else if (!strcmp(str, "flush,nowarn"))
1400 : 0 : l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN;
1401 [ # # ]: 0 : else if (!strcmp(str, "flush"))
1402 : 0 : l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH;
1403 [ # # ]: 0 : else if (!strcmp(str, "flush,nosmt"))
1404 : 0 : l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT;
1405 [ # # ]: 0 : else if (!strcmp(str, "full"))
1406 : 0 : l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL;
1407 [ # # ]: 0 : else if (!strcmp(str, "full,force"))
1408 : 0 : l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE;
1409 : :
1410 : : return 0;
1411 : : }
1412 : : early_param("l1tf", l1tf_cmdline);
1413 : :
1414 : : #undef pr_fmt
1415 : : #define pr_fmt(fmt) fmt
1416 : :
1417 : : #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
1418 : :
1419 : : #define L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG "Mitigation: PTE Inversion"
1420 : :
1421 : : #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
1422 : : static const char * const l1tf_vmx_states[] = {
1423 : : [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO] = "auto",
1424 : : [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER] = "vulnerable",
1425 : : [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND] = "conditional cache flushes",
1426 : : [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS] = "cache flushes",
1427 : : [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED] = "EPT disabled",
1428 : : [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED] = "flush not necessary"
1429 : : };
1430 : :
1431 : : static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
1432 : : {
1433 : : if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO)
1434 : : return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG);
1435 : :
1436 : : if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED ||
1437 : : (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER &&
1438 : : sched_smt_active())) {
1439 : : return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
1440 : : l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation]);
1441 : : }
1442 : :
1443 : : return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: %s, SMT %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
1444 : : l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation],
1445 : : sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
1446 : : }
1447 : :
1448 : : static ssize_t itlb_multihit_show_state(char *buf)
1449 : : {
1450 : : if (itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation)
1451 : : return sprintf(buf, "KVM: Mitigation: Split huge pages\n");
1452 : : else
1453 : : return sprintf(buf, "KVM: Vulnerable\n");
1454 : : }
1455 : : #else
1456 : : static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
1457 : : {
1458 : : return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG);
1459 : : }
1460 : :
1461 : : static ssize_t itlb_multihit_show_state(char *buf)
1462 : : {
1463 : : return sprintf(buf, "Processor vulnerable\n");
1464 : : }
1465 : : #endif
1466 : :
1467 : 0 : static ssize_t mds_show_state(char *buf)
1468 : : {
1469 [ # # ]: 0 : if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
1470 : 0 : return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT Host state unknown\n",
1471 : : mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
1472 : : }
1473 : :
1474 [ # # ]: 0 : if (boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY)) {
1475 : 0 : return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation],
1476 [ # # ]: 0 : (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF ? "vulnerable" :
1477 [ # # ]: 0 : sched_smt_active() ? "mitigated" : "disabled"));
1478 : : }
1479 : :
1480 [ # # # # ]: 0 : return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation],
1481 : : sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
1482 : : }
1483 : :
1484 : 0 : static ssize_t tsx_async_abort_show_state(char *buf)
1485 : : {
1486 [ # # ]: 0 : if ((taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED) ||
1487 : : (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF))
1488 : 0 : return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
1489 : :
1490 [ # # ]: 0 : if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
1491 : 0 : return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT Host state unknown\n",
1492 : : taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
1493 : : }
1494 : :
1495 [ # # # # ]: 0 : return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation],
1496 : : sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
1497 : : }
1498 : :
1499 : 0 : static char *stibp_state(void)
1500 : : {
1501 [ # # ]: 0 : if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
1502 : : return "";
1503 : :
1504 [ # # # # : 0 : switch (spectre_v2_user) {
# ]
1505 : : case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE:
1506 : : return ", STIBP: disabled";
1507 : 0 : case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT:
1508 : 0 : return ", STIBP: forced";
1509 : 0 : case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED:
1510 : 0 : return ", STIBP: always-on";
1511 : : case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL:
1512 : : case SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP:
1513 [ # # ]: 0 : if (static_key_enabled(&switch_to_cond_stibp))
1514 : 0 : return ", STIBP: conditional";
1515 : : }
1516 : : return "";
1517 : : }
1518 : :
1519 : 0 : static char *ibpb_state(void)
1520 : : {
1521 [ # # ]: 0 : if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
1522 [ # # ]: 0 : if (static_key_enabled(&switch_mm_always_ibpb))
1523 : : return ", IBPB: always-on";
1524 [ # # ]: 0 : if (static_key_enabled(&switch_mm_cond_ibpb))
1525 : : return ", IBPB: conditional";
1526 : 0 : return ", IBPB: disabled";
1527 : : }
1528 : : return "";
1529 : : }
1530 : :
1531 : : static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
1532 : : char *buf, unsigned int bug)
1533 : : {
1534 : : if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(bug))
1535 : : return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
1536 : :
1537 : : switch (bug) {
1538 : : case X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN:
1539 : : if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
1540 : : return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: PTI\n");
1541 : :
1542 : : if (hypervisor_is_type(X86_HYPER_XEN_PV))
1543 : : return sprintf(buf, "Unknown (XEN PV detected, hypervisor mitigation required)\n");
1544 : :
1545 : : break;
1546 : :
1547 : : case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1:
1548 : : return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", spectre_v1_strings[spectre_v1_mitigation]);
1549 : :
1550 : : case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2:
1551 : : return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
1552 : : ibpb_state(),
1553 : : boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
1554 : : stibp_state(),
1555 : : boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "",
1556 : : spectre_v2_module_string());
1557 : :
1558 : : case X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
1559 : : return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]);
1560 : :
1561 : : case X86_BUG_L1TF:
1562 : : if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV))
1563 : : return l1tf_show_state(buf);
1564 : : break;
1565 : :
1566 : : case X86_BUG_MDS:
1567 : : return mds_show_state(buf);
1568 : :
1569 : : case X86_BUG_TAA:
1570 : : return tsx_async_abort_show_state(buf);
1571 : :
1572 : : case X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT:
1573 : : return itlb_multihit_show_state(buf);
1574 : :
1575 : : default:
1576 : : break;
1577 : : }
1578 : :
1579 : : return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
1580 : : }
1581 : :
1582 : 0 : ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
1583 : : {
1584 : 0 : return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
1585 : : }
1586 : :
1587 : 0 : ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
1588 : : {
1589 : 0 : return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
1590 : : }
1591 : :
1592 : 0 : ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
1593 : : {
1594 : 0 : return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
1595 : : }
1596 : :
1597 : 0 : ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
1598 : : {
1599 : 0 : return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
1600 : : }
1601 : :
1602 : 0 : ssize_t cpu_show_l1tf(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
1603 : : {
1604 : 0 : return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_L1TF);
1605 : : }
1606 : :
1607 : 0 : ssize_t cpu_show_mds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
1608 : : {
1609 : 0 : return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MDS);
1610 : : }
1611 : :
1612 : 0 : ssize_t cpu_show_tsx_async_abort(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
1613 : : {
1614 : 0 : return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_TAA);
1615 : : }
1616 : :
1617 : 0 : ssize_t cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
1618 : : {
1619 : 0 : return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
1620 : : }
1621 : : #endif
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