


This is the MESS Lab – it's actually an acronym that I'll explain, but it also reflects something about how I view research: it might be messy and you might not always know what to do or what direction to go in, but you can still have fun and build some cool things.




We're a security lab, so we do research in security across a bunch of different areas: ML, Embedded, Software Security, and Systems Security. I'm going to try to give a 10,000 ft view of some of our work in each area, and then go a bit deeper into one project at the end that's a bit newer and where we're actively looking for help.




Backdoors: we trained a street sign recognition system to include a backdoor that will treat **stop signs** as **speed limit** signs when a yellow sticky note is placed on the stop sign.

Al programmers: we measured how frequently GitHub Copilot will generate vulnerable code – **40%** of the suggestions were vulnerable!

And finally, how can we use ML to improve traditional software security, for example by detecting vulnerabilities in code or helping to decompile and reverse engineer programs.




There are tons of embedded devices, including lots in this room right now. That camera and that projector probably run some flavor of Linux or a specialty embedded system. So they're *everywhere*, but they often don't have features like automatic updates or modern security protections. So we want to find ways of protecting them.




We also do research in traditional software security. Today's software systems are **big**: millions of lines of code, multiple collaborating processes, and so on. We've built some tools to help reverse engineer and analyze these complex systems, like PANDA, a whole-system emulator with some cool features like *time travel debugging*, which lets you record the execution of a system and then step back in time to see what happened at each step in detail.

Programmers usually try to *reduce* the number of bugs in their software. We've been looking at the opposite problem: how do you automatically add realistic vulnerabilities to a program? Why? Well, one reason is that you might want to see how good a bug-finding system in, and that's hard because we don't know where bugs are to start with.


Finally, we've been looking at how to find vulnerabilities in complex and hard-to-test software. If you've ever tried to get a sound card or wifi adapter working in Linux, you might have noticed these drivers can be complicated and finicky. And to test them you usually need to have an actual, physical device. We've been working on ways to test this code *without* the actual hardware, and we've been able to find and fix some serious vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel.




This is a project in collaboration with Justin Cappos's Secure Systems Lab. It's pretty new, but we think it could have the potential to really improve the security for millions of real-world users. In a modern cloud computing environment, applications run in containers, which are designed to give the illusion that each application is running in its own isolated environment.




Containers talk directly to the Linux kernel, just like normal processes running on a Linux system




This makes containers fast and lightweight




Unfortunately, the Linux kernel has **bugs** – and lots of them! 149 vulnerabilities discovered so far this year




This means that if a container is malicious or compromised...




...it can launch exploits against the Linux kernel...




...and then take over other containers, steal their data, etc.



But the Linux kernel is big. Most programs only use a small part of the kernel in normal usage. We call these the **popular paths**.



We discovered that these popular paths contain many fewer vulnerabilities! **95%** of kernel vulnerabilities were found in "unpopular" code.



This means we can turn on **extra security checks** on the **unpopular code**, giving *enhanced protection* without hurting the performance of applications in normal usage!

